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Abstract: We provide a framework for analyzing bilateral mergers
when there is two-sided asymmetric information about firms’ types.
We show that there is always a “no-merger” equilibrium where firms
do not consent to a merger, irrespective of their type. There may
also be a “cut-oﬀ” equilibrium if the expected merger returns satisfy a
suitable single crossing condition, which will hold if a firm’s merger re-
turns are “essentially monotone decreasing” in its type. Applying our
analysis to the linear Cournot model, we show how the merger pattern
depends on the cost eﬀects of mergers, the extent of uncertainty, and
the way profits are split. Specifically, we show how increasing uncer-
tainty about competitor types may foster mergers as firms hope for
strong rationalization eﬀects.
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1 Introduction
When Dynegy was considering a takeover of Enron in autumn 2001, it was
certainly aware that the potential acquiree was in trouble. Quite clearly,
however, Dynegy initially underestimated the magnitude of the problem.1
After the company had found out more about its target, it invoked a “mate-
rial adverse change” clause to retreat from the deal. Yet, not all firms that
recently considered mergers or acquisitions were lucky enough to find ways
out of a transaction with partners that turned out to be less attractive than
expected. For example, in the merger with the German Hypobank, it took
Hypovereinsbank more than two years “to discover the full horror of its part-
ner’s balance sheet” (The Economist, July 20, 2000). More generally, many
mergers are considered as failures with the benefit of hindsight.2
Such anecdotes suggest that standard results from the analysis of “lemons”
markets (Akerlof 1970) can explain the mechanics of mergers under asymmet-
ric information. However, there are two reasons why this is not clear. First,
even though anecdotes on failed mergers and takeovers typically single out
one of the partners as the lemon, the asymmetric information surrounding
mergers is usually two-sided: Each of the firms knows more about its quality
than the potential partner does. Both parties thus face the risk of joining
a bad partner who adversely aﬀects the profits of the merged entity. In
the present paper, we therefore consider mergers under two-sided asymmet-
ric information about firms’ types.3 High types are defined as having high
1Dynegy’s former CEO C. Watson is cited in The Economist (November 15, 2001) to
have “looked under the hood”, finding that Enron “might need a new paint job and some
new tyres, but its engine is sound.”
2See, for instance, the studies of Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987; 1989), but note also
the results of Healy et al. (1992).
3Hviid and Prendergast (1993) provide an analysis of merger games with one-sided
asymmetric information. Assuming that the target firm has private information about
its profitability, they show that an unsuccessful bid may increase the profitability of the
target but reduce the profitability of the bidding firm (relative to the profitability before
the merger oﬀer) due to learning from rejection.
1
stand-alone profits–that is, high profits in the absence of a merger–and as
contributing to high merger profits if the transaction occurs.
Second, while the market for firms resembles a standard lemons market
in the sense that low types have lower stand-alone profits (stand-alone profit
eﬀect), there is a crucial diﬀerence: In contrast to the lemons market, lower
types will generally also have lower profits than high types if a transaction
occurs, since low types will drive down profits of the merged entity. Assuming
that lower profits of the merged entity translate into lower profits for the
former owners of each of its constituent parts, low types will expect to earn
less than high types if they become part of a merged firm (post-merger profit
eﬀect).4 This feature distinguishes mergers from transactions like the sale of
used cars, where the seller’s profit is independent of the type of the car, as
all types must sell at the same price.5 As a result, it is not obvious whether
low types have more to gain from entering a merger than high types.
Against this background, we set out to analyze issues that are familiar
from the adverse selection literature. Specifically, we investigate under which
conditions asymmetric information about the firms’ types might lead to a
breakdown of the market for firms, that is, to a no-merger equilibrium where
firms never consent to a transaction. Moreover, we establish conditions under
which, in equilibrium, only the relatively low types are going to merge, as
the lemons analogy would suggest.
To this end, we analyze a merger game in which two firms are matched
whose types zi, i = 1, 2, are drawn from distributions that are common knowl-
edge.6 After having observed their own type, both firms state whether they
consent to a merger. If both firms consent, a merger takes place. If at
4When the transaction is financed with cash, the post-merger profit eﬀect is absent for
the owners of the acquired firm. Even for them, however, knowledge of the competitor’s
type would be helpful for the acquisition decision, as stand-alone profits and thus merger
returns depend on this type.
5We are obviously abstracting from warranty payments here.
6In specific applications, types may be interpreted as cost or demand parameters, with
lower cost or higher demand corresponding to a better type.
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least one firm declines, there is no merger. Following the merger game, an
oligopoly game is played. If no merger occurs, both firms earn their stand-
alone profits. If a merger occurs, the joint profit is shared according to some
predetermined rule.7
We develop our theory in a relatively general reduced-form model and
illustrate its application in a set of examples based on the standard linear
Cournot oligopoly model. For the general model, we first show that the
merger game always has a Bayesian equilibrium where players never consent
to a merger, no matter what their type is. The remaining results depend on
the relation between firm types and merger returns, which are defined as the
diﬀerence between the pre- and post-merger profits for the owners of each
firm. For instance, we give conditions on this relation guaranteeing that the
no-merger equilibrium is unique–corresponding to a “no-trade” result.
Next, we analyze the merger pattern, i.e., we ask what types of firms
consent to mergers under two-sided asymmetric information. Unsurprisingly,
when the merger returns are decreasing in the type of a firm, the equilibria
will be of the cut-oﬀ type where only low types consent to a merger. This
result is potentially relevant to the “Merger Puzzle” (Scherer 2002), that, in
spite of their ubiquity, mergers are often considered as failures: If bad types
are more likely to merge than good types (adverse selection), this would
suggest that merged entities do badly because they consist of bad firms.
The cut-oﬀ result for monotone merger returns is useful in our applica-
tions, but it has some limitations: First, as argued before, the monotonicity
of the merger returns is not guaranteed in general. Therefore, we show that
the cut-oﬀ result generalizes to the class of “essentially monotone decreasing
7We realize that our model is highly reduced. Obviously, the terms of a merger are
usually the outcome of a complex bargaining process. However, the literature on bar-
gaining with two-sided incomplete information (e.g. Ausubel et al. 2002) shows that such
models often admit a multitude of equilibria, and the outcomes often depend delicately
on the details of the bargaining protocol. Therefore, we believe that the reduced form
approach adopted in this paper is useful for making progress with respect to the issues we
are interested in.
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functions”, which contains many single-peaked functions. Second, the cut-oﬀ
result does not preclude degenerate cases where either all types consent to
a merger or only the “no-trade” equilibrium exists.8 We thus provide both
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for non-degenerate cut-oﬀ equilibria to
exist.
We then apply our results in a linear Cournot setting. We show how
merger patterns depend on the following underlying conditions:
(i) The technology of the merged firm and, specifically, the eﬀect of the
merger on the marginal cost of the merged firm;
(ii) The profit sharing rule, that is, the mechanism determining how post-
merger profits are split between the owners of the two constituent firms;
(iii) The extent of uncertainty surrounding the transaction.
We start with the case of rationalization mergers, where the merged firm
produces with the minimum of the marginal costs of its constituent parts.
Under symmetric information, such mergers increase joint profits if the firms
are suﬃciently heterogenous because the more eﬃcient firm rationalizes the
less eﬃcient competitor (Barros 1998), whereas this is impossible for homo-
geneous firms (Salant et al. 1983). With this in mind, we prove the following
results. First, if firms have to commit to a fixed split of profits before a
merger takes place, then there can be no symmetric equilibrium where a
positive measure of firms consents to a merger under uncertainty. Second,
when firms commit to fixed shares of the joint surplus or pay cash for the
transaction, mergers will only take place when the uncertainty is suﬃciently
large. Intuitively, when uncertainty is large, firms can hope that they will
turn out to be suﬃciently asymmetric ex post for rationalization eﬀects in
the sense of Barros to materialize, whereas for small uncertainty they know
they will essentially be in the Salant et al. case ex post.
8In these degenerate cases, the cut-oﬀ value are identical to the highest or the lowest
possible type, respectively.
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Finally, we compare the results for rationalization mergers with those for
synergy mergers, where the merged entity produces with the best available
technology. Here, we focus on the case where firms commit to a fixed split
of profits. In this setting, we generally obtain cut-oﬀ equilibria.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we
introduce the main assumptions of our model. Section 3 characterizes the
Bayesian equilibria for the class of games under consideration, primarily fo-
cussing on the case where merger returns are monotone decreasing in the
firms’ types. Section 4 provides a detailed analysis of horizontal mergers in
the linear Cournot setting when there is two-sided asymmetric information.
In section 5, we generalize our analysis to cases where merger returns are not
monotone decreasing in firm types. Section 6 concludes.
2 Assumptions
We consider an oligopoly with an exogenous number of firms n ≥ 2. Two
of these firms, denoted as i = 1, 2, play a merger game. The firms may
be active in the same market (and thus contemplate a horizontal merger).
Alternatively, they might be operating in a vertical relationship (vertical
merger), or producing unrelated goods (conglomerate merger). Each firm is
characterized by a type zi ∈ R, which influences its profitability. There is
asymmetric information about the value of zi, i.e. firms know their own zi,
but not their competitor’s zj, j 6= i. The ex ante probability of zi is described
by a probability distribution Fi with density fi and compact support [zi, zi] ⊂
R.9 Fi is common knowledge. Note that we allow for ex ante heterogeneity
between firms, i.e. firms’ types zi may be drawn from diﬀerent distributions.10
9It is possible to extend the analysis to the case where the support of Fi is not compact,
though we do not pursue this issue here.
10This is of particular importance for vertical or conglomerate mergers where firms
are producing entirely diﬀerent goods. Even the interpretation of the firms’ types might
diﬀer. For vertical mergers, for instance, the types might correspond to the costs of input
production for the upstream firm and marketing ability for the downstream firm.
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Firms simultaneously announce whether they are willing to merge.11 The
decision of firm i is summarized in a variable si such that si = 1 if it consents
to an agreement and si = 0 if it rejects it. If no merger occurs, each firm earns
its stand-alone oligopoly profit πi (zi, zj). This function is defined on some set
Z ⊃ [z1, z1]×[z2, z2] . The properties of πi reflect more primitive assumptions
on the nature of product market interaction and the interpretation of the type
variable. At this stage, we do not want to constrain the shape of πi (zi, zj)
too much. However, throughout the paper, we shall require the following
assumption to be satisfied.
Assumption 1 πi is non-decreasing in zi.
Thus, by definition, the higher a firm’s type, the higher its stand-alone
profits. With respect to the relation between zj and πi, j 6= i, we make no
assumption at this stage to allow for various forms of firm interaction. For
instance, if firms are competitors and the type variable reflects eﬃciency,
greater eﬃciency of firm j translates into lower profits of firm i in most
applications. However, if firms i and j are in a vertical relation, the opposite
relation is more plausible.
If a merger occurs, the merged entity earns total profit πM (zi, zj). This
profit is shared between the owners of each of the formerly separate firms.
The owners of firm i earn profits πMi (zi, zj), i, j = 1, 2, j 6= i, such that
πM1 (z1, z2) + π
M
2 (z2, z1) = π
M (z1, z2) .
Like πi, the functions πMi and π
M reflect assumptions on product market
interaction and the interpretation of the type variable. In addition, πMi de-
pends on the way profits are shared if a merger takes place. There is no
commonly accepted theory of how profits of a merged entity are split be-
tween the owners of formerly separate firms. We shall therefore not impose
much structure on the general model. It is natural to suppose that the split
11Sequentiality of decisions does not lead to substantial changes of the results (see Borek
et al. 2003).
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of profits reflected in πMi is the outcome of a bargaining process that precedes
the merger decision summarized in si. In this bargaining process, firms typ-
ically reveal information about their types and they are thus able to update
their beliefs about the potential partner’s type. That is, the distribution
functions Fi, i = 1, 2, describing the probability of zi should be regarded
as being conditional on any information revealed in the bargaining process.
For our analysis to be interesting, we require that, whatever the bargaining
process, firms do not fully reveal their types before final acceptance decisions
are made.
We maintain the following assumption on πM .
Assumption 2 πM is non-decreasing in zi and zj.
This assumption is natural: The more eﬃcient the constituent parts,
the more eﬃcient should the merged firm be. Note that we do not make
any assumptions on the eﬀect of the type variable on πMi , thereby avoiding
assumptions on the bargaining process. Instead, we shall show how diﬀerent
ways of splitting the pie will translate into diﬀerent predictions on the merger
pattern. We shall consider the following three profit sharing rules.
Fixed Profit Shares Firm i obtains a predetermined share αi ∈ [0, 1] of
the merged entity’s total profit πM (zi, zj) , i.e.
πMi (zi, zj) = αiπ
M (zi, zj) .
The Fixed Profit Shares rule imposes that firms ex ante commit to a
particular split of profits, even if one firm turns out to be very ineﬃcient ex
post. This is essentially the way profits are shared if the owners of a merging
firm are compensated for bringing in assets by shares in the new firm.
Joint Surplus Sharing Firm i obtains its stand-alone profit plus a prede-
termined share βi(zi, zj) ∈ [0, 1] of the total change in profits, i.e.
πMi (zi, zj) = πi (zi, zj) + βi(zi, zj)
£
πM (zi, zj)− πi (zi, zj)− πj (zj, zi)
¤
.
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According to the Joint Surplus Sharing rule, the owners agree on a con-
tract such that both win if total profits increase and both lose if total profits
fall. We do not claim that the joint surplus rule corresponds to a common
real-world case. However, such a procedure is conceivable when types are
revealed (and verifiable) after the merger takes place, so that contracts can
be conditioned on types.
Cash Payment The owners of one firm, say firm 2, are compensated by
the cash payment p > 0 for the takeover by the other firm, i.e.
πM1 (z1, z2) = π
M (z1, z2)− p;
πM2 (z2, z1) = p.
The Cash Payment rule brings the setting closer to one-sided asymmetric
information. Even though neither firm knows the competitor’s type, the
post-merger profit for firm 2’s owners is independent of firm 1’s type: They
are compensated with a fixed cash payment. Nevertheless, the asymmetric
information remains relevant for firm 2’s merger decision, as the type of firm
1 influences firm 2’s stand-alone profits and thus its merger returns.
Henceforth, we shall use the following formal definition of merger returns:
Definition 1 Firm i’s returns from the merger are given by
gi (zi, zj) ≡ πMi (zi, zj)− πi (zi, zj) .
The form of the function gi will determine our main results. Note that
Assumptions 1 and 2 impose little structure on gi. In fact, it is not even clear
that merger returns are decreasing in own type, that is, higher types are less
likely to enter merger agreements. By Assumption 1, better types would earn
higher stand-alone profits. By Assumption 2, however, they would also earn
higher profits in a merged firm. The net eﬀect is unclear.
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3 Results
In this section, we characterize the Bayesian equilibrium of the class of merger
games under consideration in general terms.12 The results in this section are
chosen because they are straightforward to apply to particular examples (see
section 4). Section 5 contains more general results, which, however, are not
as simple.
The following notation is useful: For i = 1, 2, if firm i plays a strategy
si (zi) , we define Bi ≡ Bi (si) ≡ {zi |si (zi) = 1}, i.e., Bi denotes the set of
types zi for which firm i consents to a merger. Further, let
Gi (zi;Bj, fj) ≡
Z
Bj
gi (zi, zj) fj (zj) dzj
denote the expected merger returns for firm i with type zi when players j
are distributed as fj, and only players in Bj consent to a merger.
3.1 Cut-Oﬀ Equilibria
First, we give conditions under which low types are more likely to merge
in equilibrium, that is, there is a cut-oﬀ equilibrium where only low types
consent to a merger. Therefore, for cut-oﬀ equilibria there is a monotone
relation between types zi and strategies si. Such equilibria are common in
Bayesian games: Examples include first-price auctions where the type is the
bidder’s valuation and the strategy is the bid, double auctions where the
types of buyers and seller are valuations and costs, and the strategies are
bids and asks (Chatterjee and Samuelson 1983), wars of attrition where the
type is the valuation for the prize and the strategy is the quitting period,
and games of public good provision where types correspond to the costs of
providing a public good and actions correspond to the provision decision.13
Athey (2001) analyzes more generally under which such monotone equilibria
arise.
12We shall apply our general analysis in a linear Cournot setting in Section 4.
13See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for a discussion of these games.
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We shall use the following terminology.
Definition 2 The function Gi : [zi, zi] → R satisfies strong downward
single crossing (SSC−) if, for all zHi , z
L
i ∈ [zi, zi] such that zHi > zLi , Gi
¡
zHi
¢
≥
0 implies Gi
¡
zLi
¢
≥ 0 and Gi
¡
zHi
¢
> 0 implies Gi
¡
zLi
¢
> 0.
This definition is closely related to the familiar single-crossing property
of incremental returns (Milgrom and Shannon 1994).14 We first give a cut-
oﬀ condition in terms of expected merger returns, and then consider more
primitive conditions on actual merger returns gi.15
Lemma 1 Suppose Gi (zi;Bj, fj) satisfies SSC− in zi for all Bj ⊂ Zj and
all fj. Then every Bayesian Equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2) in pure strategies with
P [Bi (s∗i )] > 0 satisfies the cut-oﬀ-property, that is, there are cut-oﬀ values
z∗i ∈ Zi such that
s∗i (zi) =
(
1, if zi ≤ z∗i ;
0, if zi > z∗i ;
i = 1, 2.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. SSC− states that, for any distribution
of zj, if some type zi consents to a merger, so will any lower type z0i < zi, no
matter what the distribution of zj is. The result applies this property to the
distribution of zj corresponding to the equilibrium behavior of zj.
Lemma 1 immediately implies the following result.
Proposition 1 If gi (zi, zj) is monotone decreasing in zi, then every Bayesian
Equilibrium satisfies the cut-oﬀ property.
14Let Πi (si, zi;Bj , fj) define the expected payoﬀ from strategy si for a firm with type
zi, facing a competitor characterized by Bj and fj . Then Πi (si, zi;Bj , fj) satisfies the
Milgrom-Shannon Single-Crossing Property in (−si, zi) if and only if Gi satisfies SSC−.
15Using the equivalence between SSC− and the Milgrom-Shannon condition, Lemma 1
is a special case of Theorem 1 in Athey (2001).
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The intuition for this result is simple: If higher types have less to gain
from a merger for arbitrary realizations of types, then clearly they must gain
less in expectation.
Proposition 1 does not exclude degenerate cut-oﬀ equilibria where all
or no types are willing to merge. The following result provides a simple
condition under which such non-degenerate equilibria exist.16
Corollary 1 If gi is monotone decreasing in zi, i = 1, 2, and if for all i, j =
1, 2, i 6= j, there exist zei ∈ (zi, zi) such thatZ zej
zj
gi (z
e
i , zj) fj (zj) dzj = 0, (1)
then there is a Bayesian Equilibrium (s∗1, s
∗
2) of the simultaneous merger game
in pure strategies such that the cut-oﬀ values satisfy z∗i = z
e
i .
The result is straightforward to prove. Intuitively, Corollary 1 states that,
in equilibrium, firm i with the cut-oﬀ type zei = z
∗
i is just indiﬀerent between
consenting to the merger and rejecting it, since the expected returns from
merging with types below the cut-oﬀ level zej equal zero. That is, since gi is
decreasing in zi by assumption, all types below zei will consent to the merger,
whereas all types above zei will reject it.
Together, Proposition 1 and Corollary 1 say that the lemons logic carries
over to our setting with two-sided asymmetric information, provided that
merger returns are monotone decreasing in own type. Our linear Cournot
example in section 4 will illustrate, however, that the monotonicity condi-
tion is surprisingly restrictive. We shall therefore provide a generalization
of the monotonicity condition to a wider class of functions, including many
single-peaked functions, in section 5. Yet, even this generalized monotonicity
condition turns out to be violated quite often.
16It is possible to derive a uniqueness condition, which makes sure that one reaction
function is always steeper than the other. As this condition is not particularly illuminating,
we refrained from stating it.
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The cut-oﬀ nature of the equilibrium suggests that low types are more
likely to merge than high types if the relevant conditions hold. This conclu-
sion has an interesting implication that is relevant to a better understand-
ing of the “Merger Puzzle” (Scherer 2002), that, in spite of their ubiquity,
mergers often turn out to be failures: If firm types are drawn from identi-
cal distributions, merged entities perform badly simply because of adverse
selection.
However, this conclusion needs to be interpreted carefully. For suppose
there is ex ante heterogeneity, i.e., firms’ types are drawn from diﬀerent
distributions. Assume for simplicity that firm 2 is chosen from a distribution
that is generated by a shift of firm 1’s distribution to the right. Then a
low-type firm 2 with state z˜2 consenting to a merger might have a higher
type than a high-type firm 1 with state z˜1 that does not consent to a merger.
Figure 1 illustrates this argument.
<Figure 1 around here>
Another simple property of the cut-oﬀ equilibrium is that there typically
is a non-degenerate measure of types for which mergers are not profitable ex
post: Types that are just below the cut-oﬀ level break even in expectation,
but make losses if the partner is drawn from the lower tail of the distribution
(“ex post regret”). That is, mutual uncertainty about the potential partner’s
type may help explain why mergers often turn out to be non-profitable ex
post.
This feature of the model contrasts with familiar results on two-sided
asymmetric information, for instance, in the context of double auctions,
where the valuations of buyers and the costs of sellers are private informa-
tion (Chatterjee and Samuelson 1983). While ineﬃcient no-trade outcomes
loom large in this literature, ex post regret about trade is not an equilibrium
phenomenon. This follows from the fact that knowledge of the other type
matters only for how much can be extracted from the other party. In the
context of mergers, however, it is also relevant for one’s own valuation of
12
the transaction. More generally, the fact that valuations are endogenous–
influenced by both players’ types via their market interaction–rather than
exogenous (and equivalent to one player’s type) complicates our analysis.17
3.2 No-Merger Equilibrium
We first derive a simple no-merger result: For arbitrary distributions of types,
there is always a degenerate cut-oﬀ equilibrium where no type merges.
Proposition 2 (no-merger) Each strategy pair (s1, s2) with
P [Bi (si)] ≡
Z
Bi
fi (zi) dzi = 0, i = 1, 2,
is a Bayesian Equilibrium of the merger game.
Proof. See Appendix.
The result is very intuitive: If both firms believe that the other firm will
not consent to a merger–no matter what its type is–it is a (weakly) best
response not to consent, and beliefs are correct in equilibrium. Thus, there
always is an equilibrium where firms merge with probability zero. Note,
however, that the no-merger equilibrium is Pareto-dominated in terms of
expected profits whenever a cut-oﬀ equilibrium exists where firms consent to
a merger with strictly positive probability.
The next proposition gives conditions on the expected merger returns
guaranteeing that there is no other equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Suppose Zi = Zj = Z. Further assume that, for i, j =
1, 2, j 6= i, gi is non-increasing in zi and non-decreasing in zj.
(i) If, for all i ∈ {1, 2}, there is no bzi such that gi (bzi, bzi) ≥ 0, then there
is no Bayesian Equilibrium with P [Bi (s∗i )] > 0.
17A parallel arises in the auctions literature: Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) have recently
considered second-price, sealed-bid auctions where the valuation for the object is also
determined endogenously through the market interaction of players.
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(ii) If, for at least one i ∈ {1, 2}, there is no bzi such that gi (bzi, bzi) ≥ 0,
then there is no symmetric Bayesian Equilibrium with identical cut-oﬀ
values where P [Bi (s∗i )] > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, even though the Assumptions of Proposition 3 are consistent with
Proposition 1, so that every equilibrium must be of the cut-oﬀ type, only the
degenerate cut-oﬀ equilibrium with P [Bi (s∗i )] = 0 can exist.
The result is useful in applications such as the linear Cournot model
with n ≥ 3 firms where, for homogeneous firms, joint profits decrease with
a merger (see section 4). Then, gi (bzi, bzi) < 0 must hold for at least one
firm. It follows immediately that there cannot be a symmetric equilibrium.
If, in addition, profits are shared such that gi (bzi, bzi) < 0 for both firms and
arbitrary bzi, then at least one firm must have negative merger returns for
every conceivable combination of types, and thus negative expected merger
returns. As a result, there is no equilibrium where firms merge with strictly
positive probability.
4 Example: Horizontal Cournot Model
We now apply our results to horizontal mergers in a linear Cournot setting,
where we think of the type as the negative of marginal costs. We shall
show how predictions on the merger pattern depend on (i) the eﬀect of the
merger on the new entity’s marginal costs, (ii) the sharing rule adopted by
the merging firms, and (iii) the extent of asymmetric information.
As a background, recall the following results familiar from the literature
on mergers in the Cournot model without asymmetric information. Salant
et al. (1983) have shown that bilateral mergers of homogeneous firms are
never profitable (except for mergers to monopoly) if they do not reduce mar-
ginal costs. Barros (1998) notes that bilateral mergers may be profitable
when firms are heterogenous: If the merged entity inherits the technology
14
of the more eﬃcient firm, and the marginal costs of the merging firms diﬀer
suﬃciently, a rationalization eﬀect will render the merger profitable.
Now consider a setting with two-sided asymmetric information. Suppose
there are three firms with marginal costs ci, i = 1, 2, 3, and inverse demand is
given by P (Q) = a− bQ, where Q =
P
i qi is aggregate output and a, b > 0.
We consider a merger game between firm 1 and 2. The firms’ types are defined
as zi ≡ −ci, i.e. the negative of marginal costs. Suppose that z1 and z2 are
uniformly distributed with compact support Z = Z1 = Z2 = [z, z]. As in
Barros (1998), we first suppose that the merged firm inherits the technology
of the more eﬃcient firm (rationalization mergers). The type of the merged
firm is thus given by zm = max(z1, z2). We then consider mergers that
reduce the level of marginal cost even below that of the more eﬃcient firm,
i.e. mergers that give rise to synergies (synergy mergers). More precisely, in
the synergy case, we suppose that the merged firm produces with the lowest
marginal cost that any firm could conceivably have, i.e., zm = z. Thus, the
synergy case correspond to an extremely favorable view of the merger eﬀects.
We shall use the following specific parameter values: a = 200, b = 1, c3 =
100. Furthermore, we use γ ∈ [0, 20] to define the support of the type distri-
bution as
Z = [− (100 + γ) ,− (100− γ)],
i.e., an increase in γ amounts to a mean-preserving spread (see e.g. Laﬀont
1983, pp. 24). We have chosen γ so that for all possible combinations of
types, all firms produce positive outputs. In Figure 2, the area where all
firms produce positive output is given by ABC. The shaded areas ABE
and BCD, respectively, indicate marginal cost combinations that generate
increases in total profits in case of a merger.18 The hatched area BDE gives
the cost combinations for which a merger reduces the total profits of the
merging firms.
<Figure 2 around here>
18For cost combinations in ABE, firm 1 rationalizes firm 2. For cost combinations in
BCD, the rationalization eﬀect is reversed.
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Our analysis of the equilibrium behavior distinguishes:
(i) rationalization and synergy mergers,
(ii) three sharing rules (Fixed Profit Shares, Joint Surplus Sharing, and
Cash Payment),
(iii) three diﬀerent distributions of types (γ = 2, 5 and 20, respectively).
In the following, we emphasize the most interesting results that emerge
from the Cournot model, and we sketch why these results hold.19
4.1 Rationalization Mergers
Table 1 gives a brief description of the equilibrium structure for the case of
rationalization mergers, indicating which of the following cases arises:
1) Only the no-merger equilibrium exists (∅ or ∅∗).
2) There is an equilibrium where all firms consent to the merger.
3) There is a non-degenerate cut-oﬀ equilibrium.
In case 1), the starred entries have to be taken with a grain of salt: In
those cases, we only considered “simple” equilibria where the set of players
that consent to a merger is an interval. We have not excluded the possibility
that more complicated equilibria could arise.
<Table 1 around here>
19Details of calculations are available on request from the authors.
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4.1.1 Fixed Profit Shares
Recall from section 2 that under the Fixed Profits Shares rule, firm i = 1, 2
gets a predetermined share of the merged entity’s total profits. In this case,
we obtain the result that uncertainty does not matter: As for homogeneous
firms under certainty, there are no mergers under asymmetric information
and firms that are ex-ante homogeneous.
Observation 1 For rationalization mergers with fixed profit shares αi ∈
[5/32, 27/32] and arbitrary γ ∈ [0, 20] , there is no symmetric Bayesian equi-
librium where firms 1 and 2 merge with positive probability.
This observation follows from Proposition 3(ii). To see this, suppose
that firms commit to profit shares α1, α2 ∈ [5/32, 27/32] and α1 + α2 = 1.
For these profit shares, firm i’s merger returns are monotone decreasing in
own type (∂gi/∂zi < 0) and monotone increasing in the competitor’s type
(∂gi/∂zj > 0): Intuitively, as long as one firm does not obtain a very high
profit share, the eﬀects of types on merger returns are influenced more by
the eﬀects on stand-alone profits than by the eﬀects on post-merger profits.
Furthermore, by Salant et al. (1983), there must be at least one i ∈ {1, 2} such
that gi (bz, bz) < 0 for any bz ∈ Z. Proposition 3(ii) implies that under these
conditions there cannot be a symmetric Bayesian equilibrium, irrespective of
the amount of uncertainty.20
It is important to note that the absence of mergers is not necessarily
ineﬃcient: As mergers reduce joint profits for suﬃciently homogeneous firms,
mergers are never eﬃcient for γ = 2. For larger values of γ, the absence of
mergers may well be ineﬃcient, as potential rationalization eﬀects will not
materialize. We will now show that other sharing rules might allow for the
exploitation of such rationalization eﬀects.
20Furthermore, if profit shares are not too asymmetric, such that gi (bz, bz) < 0 for all
i ∈ {1, 2}, it follows from Proposition 3(i) that an asymmetric equilibrium where firms 1
and 2 merge with posititve probability cannot exist either.
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4.1.2 Joint Surplus Sharing
Under the Joint Surplus Sharing rule, firm i = 1, 2 gets its former profit plus
a predetermined and constant share βi of the total change in profits. Our
results are summarized in the following observation.
Observation 2 For rationalization mergers with joint surplus sharing and
low uncertainty (γ = 2) , only the no-merger equilibrium exists. As the un-
certainty γ increases, non-trivial equilibria also exist where firms consent
with strictly positive probability. For high uncertainty (γ = 20), there is an
equilibrium where all types consent to a merger.
The intuition reflects familiar results from the case without uncertainty:
When the uncertainty about the competitor is small, firms know they will
turn out to be fairly similar ex post–too similar for a suﬃcient rationaliza-
tion eﬀect to materialize (as in the Salant et al. case). When uncertainty is
large, there is a chance that firms turn out to be so heterogenous that the
rationalization eﬀect is suﬃcient to make the merger profitable (as in the
Barros case).
Importantly, in the joint surplus case, merger returns are not monotone
in a firm’s type. This is best seen from Figure 2: For homogeneous firms,
merger returns are negative. Both to the right and to the left of the diagonal,
merger returns are eventually positive, as the shaded area is reached. Again,
this reflects the intuition that merger returns are positive when substantial
rationalization is possible, that is, when diﬀerences between firms are large
enough. Because of this non-monotonicity of merger returns, cut-oﬀ equilib-
ria are not guaranteed by Proposition 1 in this case.
4.1.3 Cash Payment
Under the Cash Payment rule, the owners of firm 2 are compensated by a
cash payment p > 0 by the owners of firm 1. Again, we consider diﬀerent
amounts of uncertainty. Our results are summarized as follows.
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Observation 3 For rationalization mergers with cash payment, low or medium
uncertainty (γ = 2 or γ = 5) and arbitrary price levels, only the no-merger
equilibrium exists. For high uncertainty (γ = 20), a non-trivial cut-oﬀ equi-
librium exists for suitable prices.
The intuition for the cases γ = 2 and γ = 5 is similar as in the joint
surplus case. A necessary condition for prices to exist such that some firms
consent to a merger is that expected post-merger profits are higher than the
sum of expected stand-alone profits. When uncertainty is small, firms are too
similar for this to happen. For γ = 20, there exists a set of types (z∗S, z
∗
B) for
sellers and buyers, such that the expected post-merger profits are higher than
the sum of expected stand-alone profits before the merger. On the boundary
of this set, total expected stand-alone and post-merger profits are identical
and there must therefore exist a price such that both the seller and the buyer
are indiﬀerent towards the merger. Thus, the boundary of this set contains
combinations of types that are cut-oﬀ values for suitable prices.
Again, merger returns are generally non-monotone in this case, so that
Proposition 1 does not apply. Nevertheless, we see that a non-degenerate
cut-oﬀ equilibrium may exist for suitable values of prices and uncertainty.
4.2 Synergy Mergers
Suppose now that the merger gives rise to synergies. More specifically, as-
sume that the merged firm is of the highest conceivable type, i.e. zm = z.
We confine ourselves to a discussion of the case with fixed profit shares. Our
main result is the following.
Observation 4 For synergy mergers with fixed profit shares, a cut-oﬀ equi-
librium arises for γ = {2, 5, 20}.
Intuitively, for synergy mergers with fixed profit shares, the post-merger
profit is independent of firm types. Under these conditions, the merger return
function must be monotone decreasing in own type by Assumption 2. Thus,
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high types always gain less from a merger than low types, which leads to
cut-oﬀ equilibria. Unlike the case of rationalization mergers, transactions
come about even for low uncertainty.21 This follows from the fact that even
symmetric firms may gain from mergers when there are synergies.
5 Generalizations
In this section, we consider two modifications of our analysis in section 3.
First, we show how to apply our theory when the return functions gi are
monotone increasing rather than decreasing in own type. Such a setting is
conceivable when the positive eﬀects of own type on the merged entity are
greater than the positive eﬀects on stand-alone firms. As we will sketch
below, a natural example arises when the type variable is relation-specific,
that is, corresponds to a firm characteristic which is valuable only if the
firms join forces. Second, we introduce the concept of “essentially monotone
decreasing” functions and show that Proposition 1 generalizes to the case
where the return functions gi satisfy this property.
5.1 Increasing Returns Functions
Consider the merger game outlined in section 2, where firms know their own
zi, but not their competitor’s type zj, j 6= i. However, suppose that firm types
are relation-specific in the sense that they do not aﬀect the firms’ profits in
the absence of the transaction, implying that πi, i = 1, 2, is independent
of (zi, zj) . However, if the transaction occurs, the joint profit πM (zi, zj)
is monotone increasing in both zi and zj. A plausible example of such a
setting arises when the two firms are providers of complementary assets that
are essential to carry out particular projects, but not valuable outside the
relationship. Then, provided that each party receives a positive share of each
21More specifically, for α = 0.5, there is a non-trivial cut-oﬀ equilibrium for high uncer-
tainty (γ = 20). For small and medium uncertainty (γ = 2, 5), all types consent to the
merger.
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increase in πM , the returns from the transaction, gi(zi, zj) = πMi (zi, zj)− πi,
are monotone increasing rather than decreasing in own state.
Intuition suggests that in such a setting, only high types consent to the
transaction. Contrary to the assumptions of Proposition 1, gi is monotone
increasing in own type, so that high types gain more than low types in
expectation, and the equilibria will be of the opposite cut-oﬀ type, i.e. only
good firms will consent to the merger.
5.2 Non-Monotone Returns Functions
As mentioned above, demanding that merger returns are monotone decreas-
ing in own type is more restrictive than necessary to derive a cut-oﬀ equi-
librium: By Lemma 1, it is suﬃcient that expected merger returns satisfy
SSC−. In the following, we show that a large class of functions satisfies this
condition.
To apply Proposition 1, we need to understand under which conditions
the merger return function satisfies downward single-crossing in expectation.
To this end, we define the class of essentially monotone decreasing functions
as follows. Suppose h : X ×Y −→ R is an arbitrary function on X ×Y ⊂ R2,
and let µ denote the standard Lebesgue measure on R. We use the following
notation:
Notation 1
• A (x) ≡ {y ∈ Y | h (x, y) ≥ 0}
• D (x) ≡ {y ∈ Y | h (x, y) ≤ 0}
• C ≡ {x ∈ X | µ (A (x)) > 0 ∧ µ (D (x)) > 0} .
Our merger model (where x = zi, y = zj and h = gi) serves to motivate the
notation. A (zi) corresponds to the set of types zj for which firm i with state
zi accepts an agreement under complete information, and D (zi) corresponds
to the set of types zj for which it declines.22 C is the “critical” set of types
22In both cases, the types zj for which firm i with state zi is indiﬀerent are also included.
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zi who accept an agreement with some types zj, but decline it with others.
The following definition is useful.
Definition 3 (a) h is essentially monotone decreasing (EMD) in x
if the following properties are satisfied:
(EMD1) ∀x2 ≥ x1 : µ (A (x1)) = 0 =⇒ µ (A (x2)) = 0.
(EMD2) ∀x1 ≤ x2 : µ (D (x2)) = 0 =⇒ µ (D (x1)) = 0.
(EMD3) ∀x1, x2 ∈ C, x1 < x2 :
h (x1, y) > h (x2, y) for µ-almost all y ∈ A (x1) or A (x2) , or
h (x1, y) > h (x2, y) for µ-almost all y ∈ D (x1) or D (x2) .
(EMD4) The restriction of h to the subset C ⊂ X , h |C (x, y) , is non-
increasing in x for µ-almost all y ∈ Y.
h is essentially monotone decreasing in x in the weak sense
(WEMD) if (EMD1)—(EMD3) hold.
(b) h is essentially monotone increasing (EMI) in x if −h is EMD in
x. h is essentially monotone increasing in x in the weak sense
(WEMI) if −h is WEMD in x.
Consider properties (EMD1)-(EMD4). In the model of section 2, the
interpretation of (EMD1) is that, when some low type zi does not gain from
mergers with a positive measure of other types, then neither does any higher
type z0i > zi. The interpretation of (EMD2) is similar: When some high type
z0i will enter an agreement with almost every type zj, then any lower type
zi < z
0
i will do so, too. (EMD3) and (EMD4) are additional monotonicity
requirements on the critical set of types who consent for some types, but not
for others.
To understand which functions satisfy EMD, it is useful to summarize
results on the relation between EMD and more familiar concepts.
Lemma 2 (i) h (x, y) is EMD in x if it satisfies one of the following prop-
erties (i.1)-(i.4):
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(i.1) h (x, y) is monotone decreasing in x for µ-almost all y ∈ Y.
(i.2) h (x, y) > 0 for all x ∈ X and µ-almost all y ∈ Y.
(i.3) h (x, y) < 0 for all x ∈ X and µ-almost all y ∈ Y.
(i.4) x = minX exists; h (x, y) is single-peaked in x with peak x∗ (y)
and bx = supy∈Y x∗ (y) such that bx ≤ ex ≡ inf C.
(ii) If h is EMD in x, then h (x, y) satisfies SSC− in x for µ-almost all
y ∈ Y , i.e., for all xH , xL ∈ X such that xH > xL, h
¡
xH
¢
≥ 0 implies
h
¡
xL
¢
≥ 0 and h
¡
xH
¢
> 0 implies h
¡
xL
¢
> 0
Proof. See Appendix.
Part (i) of Lemma 2 states that EMD contains monotone decreasing func-
tions (1), functions that have the same sign independent of x ((2) and (3)),
and a large class of functions that are single-peaked in x (4). Figure 3 gives
an example for the latter case: Beyond single-peakedness, EMD requires that
the peaks of the function are to the left of the critical set [c, c].
Part (ii) states that EMD implies strong downward single crossing. As
Figure 4 shows, the converse statement does not hold, because EMD includes
monotonicity properties for the critical set C ≡ [c, c], whereas SSC− does
not. Even WEMD does not hold in this particular example.
<Figures 3 and 4 around here>
The next result is crucial to show that EMD is suﬃcient for the cut-oﬀ
result that low types are more likely to engage in mergers than high types.
Proposition 4 If h satisfies (EMD), then it also satisfies downward single-
crossing in expectation (ESC−), i.e.
R
B h (x, y) f (y) dy satisfies SSC
− in
x for every pair (B, f) where B is a subset of R and f : B → R+ is a function
with
R
B f (y) dy > 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Together with Lemma 1, Proposition 4 implies that a cut-oﬀ equilib-
rium exists where only low types consent to the merger, provided that gi is
EMD.23 ,24
Finally, note that EMD is not necessary for ESC−. Nevertheless, we can
provide a partial converse of Proposition 4.
Proposition 5 If ESC− holds, h satisfies WEMD.
Proof. See Appendix
6 Conclusions
Mergers under asymmetric information diﬀer from familiar lemons problems
in two ways. First, the informational asymmetry is two-sided. Second, high
types earn more both before and after a transaction takes place. Thus, it is
not obvious that merger returns are monotone decreasing in own type and
that low types are more likely to consent to transactions than high types.
In spite of this ambiguity, we show that, in a Cournot setting with linear
demand, there are cases where merger returns are monotone decreasing in
own type, so that standard lemons results hold. Beyond that, we give a more
general condition on merger returns–that they are “essentially monotone
decreasing”–guaranteeing that low types are more likely to merge than high
types.
We also show that our merger game always has a no-merger equilibrium,
and we give conditions for this equilibrium to be unique.
Applying the general findings in the Cournot setting yields several in-
teresting results. For instance, when uncertainty is large, equilibria where
23An alternative suﬃcient condition for ESC− could have been obtained by applying
the same logic as in Athey (2000, Theorem 5). See Borek et al. (2003) for further details.
24If h satisfies EMI (rather than EMD), the result is reversed: h then satisfies upwards
single-crossing in expectation, so that in the Bayesian equilibrium only high types consent
to the merger.
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mergers occur may exist, whereas no such equilibrium would exist under
symmetric information. Intuitively, when there is considerable uncertainty
about firm types, the potential partners to a merger can hope that they will
turn out to be suﬃciently asymmetric ex post for substantial rationaliza-
tion eﬀects to materialize. However, it depends on the profit sharing rule
whether this is possible: When firms commit to a fixed share of profits ex
ante, mergers will never occur in the absence of synergies, whereas they may
occur when firms commit to a fixed price.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Firm i’s expected merger return, facing firm j with strategy sj, is
Gi (zi;Bj, fj) = P [Bj]Ezj
£
πMi (zi, zj) |zj ∈ Bj (sj)
¤
+
(1− P [Bj])Ezj [πi (zi, zj) |zj /∈ Bj (sj)]− Ezj [πi (zi, zj)]
=
Z
Bj
gi (zi, zj) fj (zj) dzj.
If Gi (zi;Bj, fj) is positive, firm i will consent to the merger, otherwise it will
reject the merger. By assumption,
R
Bj gi (zi, zj) fj (zj) dzj satisfies SSC
− in
zi. Denote the single crossing points required by Definition 2 as z◦i (sj) . Now
define
R˜i (sj) =
(
z◦i (sj) , if z
◦
i (sj) ≤ zi;
zi, if z◦i (sj) ≥ zi or if z◦i (sj) does not exist.
Then firm i’s optimal reaction is
Ri (zi, sj) =
(
1, if zi ≤ R˜i (sj) ;
0, if zi > R˜i (sj) .
In particular, for an equilibrium strategy sj, the best reply has the required
cut-oﬀ structure.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose firm i plays strategy si (zi) with P [Bi (si)] = 0. Then the probability
that a merger takes place is zero and therefore firm j 6= i is indiﬀerent
between any strategies it can play; in particular, every strategy sj (zj) with
P [Bj (sj)] = 0 is a best response.
Proof of Proposition 3
(i) Assume that, for all i ∈ {1, 2}, there is no bz such that gi (bzi, bzi) ≥ 0.
Suppose w.l.o.g. that there is a non-trivial cut-oﬀ equilibrium (z∗1 , z
∗
2)
with z∗1 ≥ z∗2. As g1(z∗1 , z∗1) < 0 and g1 is monotone increasing in z2,
g1(z
∗
1 , z2) < 0 for all z2 ≤ z∗2 . Therefore, expected equilibrium profits
for firm 1 are
R z∗2
z2
g1 (z
∗
1 , z2) f2 (z2) dz2 < 0, contradicting the condition
that
R z∗2
z2
g1 (z
∗
1, z2) f2 (z2) dz2 = 0 for the cut-oﬀ values (z
∗
1 , z
∗
2).
(ii) Suppose z∗1 = z
∗
2 ≡ z∗ and assume w.l.o.g. that g1(z∗, z∗) < 0. Then
g1(z
∗, z2) < 0 for all z2 < z∗. Thus expected equilibrium profits for firm
1 are
R z∗
z2
g1 (z
∗, z2) f2 (z2) dz2 < 0, contradicting the condition thatR z∗
z2
g1 (z
∗, z2) f2 (z2) dz2 = 0 for the cut-oﬀ values (z∗, z∗).
Proof of Lemma 2
(i.1) To show (EMD1) let x1 ∈ X such that µ (A (x1)) = 0. Then h (x1, y) <
0 for µ-almost all y ∈ Y. Since h (x, y) is monotone decreasing in x for
µ-almost all y ∈ Y it follows that h (x2, y) < h (x1, y) < 0 for all x2 > x1
and µ-almost all y ∈ Y. Therefore µ (A (x2)) = 0 for all x2 ≥ x1. The
proof of (EMD2) is analogous, (EMD3) and (EMD4) are obvious.
(i.2) If h (x, y) > 0 for all x ∈ X and µ-almost all y ∈ Y, then µ (A (x)) > 0,
µ (D (x)) = 0 for all x ∈ X , and C = ∅. Therefore (EMD1)—(EMD4)
are trivially satisfied.
(i.3) An analogous argument holds for h (x, y) < 0.
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(i.4) (EMD1) Let x1 ∈ X such that µ (A (x1)) = 0. Then h (x1, y) < 0 for µ-
almost all y ∈ Y. Since h(y) > 0 > h (x1, y) and h (x, y) is single-peaked
in x for µ-almost all y ∈ Y, it follows that h (x2, y) < h (x1, y) < 0 for
all x2 > x1 and µ-almost all y ∈ Y. Therefore µ (A (x2)) = 0 for all
x2 ≥ x1.
(EMD2) Let x2 ∈ X such that µ (D (x2)) = 0. Then h (x2, y) > 0 for
µ-almost all y ∈ Y. Since h(y) > 0 and h (x, y) is single-peaked in x
for µ-almost all y ∈ Y, it follows that h (x1, y) > 0 for all x1 ≤ x2 and
µ-almost all y ∈ Y. Therefore µ (D (x1)) = 0 for all x1 ≤ x2.
(EMD3) Let x1, x2 ∈ C, x1 < x2, and y ∈ D (x1) . Since h(y) > 0 ≥
h (x1, y) and h (x, y) is single-peaked in x for µ-almost all y ∈ Y, it
follows that h (x1, y) > h (x2, y) for µ-almost all y ∈ D (x1) .
(EMD4) As h (x, y) is single-peaked in x, it is non-increasing in x for
x ≥ bx and µ-almost all y ∈ Y. As ex ≥ bx, h (x, y) is non-increasing in x
for x ∈ C and µ-almost all y ∈ Y.
(ii) Suppose h (x, y) does not satisfy SSC− in x for µ-almost all y ∈ Y.
Then there exists x1 < x2 and M ⊂ Y with µ (M) > 0 such that
h (x1, y) ≤ 0 ≤ h (x2, y) for all y ∈ M. This implies µ (A (x2)) > 0
as M ⊂ A (x2) . Since x1 < x2 we get µ (A (x1)) > 0 by (EMD1).
Thus x1 ∈ C. An analogous argument shows that x2 ∈ C. Now if
h (x1, y) < h (x2, y) for µ-almost all y ∈M, we have a contradiction to
(EMD4), and if h (x1, y) = 0 = h (x2, y) for µ-almost all y ∈ M, we
have a contradiction to (EMD3).
Proof of Proposition 4
(a) Let x ∈ X such that µ (D (x)) = 0. Then h (x, y) > 0 for µ-almost all
y. Therefore
R
B h (x, y) f (y) dy > 0 for all (B, f) with
R
B f (y) dy > 0.
(b) For x ∈ X with µ (A (x)) = 0 an analogous argument shows thatR
B h (x, y) f (y) dy < 0 for all (B, f) with
R
B f (y) dy > 0.
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(c) Let x1, x2 ∈ C such that x1 < x2. From (EMD4) we know thatR
B h (x
1, y) f (y) dy ≥
R
B h (x
2, y) f (y) dy for all (B, f)with
R
B f (y) dy >
0. Now suppose that there exists (B0, f0) with
R
B0 f0 (y) dy > 0 such
that Z
B0
h
¡
x1, y
¢
f0 (y) dy = 0 =
Z
B0
h
¡
x2, y
¢
f0 (y) dy. (2)
This implies µ (A (xi) ∩B0) > 0 and µ (D (xi) ∩B0) > 0 for i = 1, 2.
Together with (EMD3) and (EMD4) we get
R
B0 h (x
1, y) f0 (y) dy >R
B0 h (x
2, y) f0 (y) dy, which is a contradiction to (2). Thus, for h re-
stricted to C,
R
B0 h (x, y) f (y) dy satisfies single crossing.
(d) (EMD1) and (EMD2) guarantee that sup {x ∈ X | µ (D (x)) = 0} =
inf C and supC = inf {x ∈ X | µ (A (x)) = 0} , and so (a)—(c) establish
SSC− for
R
B h (x, y) f (y) dy for all (B, f) with
R
B f (y) dy > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
(a) Suppose that (EMD1) is not satisfied. Then there exists x1 < x2 such
that µ (A (x1)) = 0 and µ (A (x2)) > 0. Therefore we can find B ⊂
A (x2) and f such that
R
B f (y) dy > 0. We thus get
R
B h (x
1, y) f (y) dy <
0 ≤
R
B h (x
2, y) f (y) dy, which is a contradiction to SSC−.
(b) The necessity of (EMD2) is proven analogously.
(c) Suppose (EMD3) is not satisfied. Then there exists x1, x2 ∈ C, x1 < x2
and M1 ⊂ A (x1) ,M2 ⊂ D (x1) with µ (Mi) > 0, i = 1, 2, such
that h (x1, y) ≤ h (x2, y) for all y ∈ M1 ∪M2. Therefore we can find
(B ⊂M1 ∪M2, f)with
R
B f (y) dy > 0 and such that 0 =
R
B h (x
1, y) f (y) dy ≤R
B h (x
2, y) f (y) dy, which contradicts SSC−. This completes the proof.
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Figure 2: Admissible range of marginal costs (a = 2, b = 1, c3 = 1).
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Table 1: Merger Pattern in the Cournot model
Rationalization Merger
zm = max(z1, z2)
Profit Sharing Uncertainty
High Medium Low
(γ = 20) (γ = 5) (γ = 2)
Fixed Share ∅ ∅ ∅
Joint Surplus all types ∅∗ ∅
Cash Payment low types ∅ ∅
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